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Morality and Situation Ethics, by Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von 
Hildebrand. Hildebrand Press, 2019. Pp. xxxviii + 180. $16.99 (paperback).
CATHERINE NOLAN, University of Dallas
This newly republished book, originally available in 1955, is an example 
of a text which proves its worth by its continued relevance today, and in 
circumstances that its author could not have anticipated.
Morality and Situation Ethics has as its primary aim to point out the 
flaws of situation ethics, which is the theory that there are no exceptionless 
moral rules and that “[t]he morally good is what our conscience tells us to 
do in a unique case when we examine all factors before God” (143). I will 
summarize this argument in the first part of this review. Von Hildebrand’s 
descriptions can be used to illuminate new situations, however, so I will 
explore a contemporary application of his work in my second section. 
Finally, I will discuss some limitations of the text before summarizing its 
highlights.
Because von Hildebrand began to formulate his arguments against 
situation ethics before Joseph Fletcher published its manifesto, Situation 
Ethics: The New Morality, in 1966, von Hildebrand is criticizing an implicit 
theory or “moral mentality” which he finds in literature rather than in aca-
demic philosophy or theology. He frames the debate by describing kinds 
of moral characters, which he relates to characters in classic works of fic-
tion. The primary contrast used by those who endorse situation ethics, 
von Hildebrand claims, is between the “pharisee” and the “tragic sinner.” 
The pharisee seeks to obey God, but only as the source of a set of rules 
that give him moral superiority over others rather than as an infinitely 
holy and mysterious being deserving of our love and adoration. The phar-
isee, therefore, opposes the spirit of the law—the true meaning of a law, 
considered in the context of the rest of morality—in order to follow the 
letter of the law—a misinterpreted and isolated law which serves to ele-
vate him and with which he judges others harshly and without mercy. The 
situation ethicist is rightly repulsed by such an attitude, and proposes as 
an alternate ideal the tragic sinner: one who is fully aware of his own sin 
but suffers because it separates him from God, for whom he has a deep 
longing. This leads the situation ethicist to a “sin mysticism” which con-
dones—or even glorifies—actions traditionally considered sinful if they 
are performed by someone of a generally moral character who is relying 
on God’s mercy. Sin is, in these cases, seen as protecting the sinner from 
pharisaical pride (91). Von Hildebrand emphasizes that the term “sin” in 
the context of this work is not intended to imply anything about the state 
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of the sinner’s soul; it refers merely to the breaking of a moral command-
ment or “attitudes embodying a moral disvalue” and the resultant offense 
against God (9).
Von Hildebrand reminds us that the truly Christian approach is neither 
the pharisee’s nor the tragic sinner’s; the situation ethicist has in fact cre-
ated a false dichotomy. While the tragic sinner may be closer to God, von 
Hildebrand points out that this closeness is not due to his sin but in spite 
of it. For every tragic sinner who longs for God and hesitates to judge his 
fellows, there are many who commit the same sin but fail to love God 
and are hypocritically ready to condemn others. What saves the tragic sin-
ner are his humility and other good character traits. The humility of the 
tragic sinner can also be found in those who have not sinned: the expe-
rience of temptation can be enough to show an innocent person his own 
weakness and prevent him from the pharisee’s confidence in his moral 
superiority (102). Moreover, even if a sin can be instrumental in bringing 
someone to a greater awareness of his need for God and his inability to 
judge others harshly, we cannot for that reason choose to sin ourselves 
or encourage others to sin. Von Hildebrand points out that every sin is 
an affront to God, and it would be incoherent to choose to distance one-
self from God directly in the hopes of bringing oneself indirectly into a 
closer relationship with God (81). There is no context in which we ought 
to neglect or disobey God’s laws—or at least the spirit of these laws—in 
order to become closer to God. Further, unless we are to assume some sort 
of divine revelation occurs each time we make a moral choice, the only 
way that we can inform our conscience is by paying attention to God’s 
commandments and the morally relevant values (such as the value of the 
human person) requiring our response (143). Situation ethics, then, has 
failed to prove its conclusions.
Von Hildebrand ends the book with a substantial argument for the con-
tentious claim that the most appropriate moral responses are only availa-
ble to the Christian: that a deep sense of moral value (such as the rightness 
of an act) depends on an awareness of and a relationship with God. While 
morally relevant values can be recognized by the non-believer, a belief in 
an all-good and all-loving God will make these values even more impor-
tant—for instance, a human person’s value is seen more clearly when he 
is understood to be immortal.
At this point, I would like to claim that the relevance of von Hildebrand’s 
text is not restricted to a single, possibly dated, debate. Due to his deep 
insight into human experience, the characters von Hildebrand describes 
are not unique to a specific era or even to the moral conflict surrounding 
situation ethics, but are found wherever humans live in societies. Situation 
ethics may be a less prominent threat today (though there are many advo-
cates of similar theories—such as utilitarianism and relativism—who agree 
that there are no universal prohibitions since every kind of action could 
be right in the right set of circumstances), but von Hildebrand’s characters 
are invaluable in understanding new problems that have arisen.
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Given the increasing polarization in politics, religion, and public life, 
we are often pressured to adopt strict systems of rules for ourselves in 
order to fit into the group with which we identify. Many use these rules to 
judge their opponents ruthlessly, as evidenced by the proliferation of scan-
dal-mongering, yellow journalism, and even fake news—not just surviv-
ing as clickbait, depending on our curiosity, but promoted and defended 
on social media by millions of people. Demonization of the opposition is 
found on both sides of most debates; it would be nearly impossible to find 
a cause whose defenders are innocent. Nevertheless, it is often difficult 
to discern whether we are ourselves engaged in hypocritical judgment of 
others or if we are righteously indignant about a genuine horror, and von 
Hildebrand’s comparison of self-righteousness and Christian judgment 
may help clarify our own actions.
Given these conditions, it seems that the character of the self-right-
eous zealot has become much more prominent today. Such a man, von 
Hildebrand states, is convinced of his own moral correctness or even 
superiority, and may indeed want to obey God. Nevertheless, such a per-
son takes pleasure in discovering and pointing out the flaws of others. He 
thinks it his moral duty to correct others, assumes the worst about their 
behavior, and is “continually indignant, continually scandalized” (21). He 
delights in making public the sins of others, since he hopes this will make 
his own righteousness more evident to all. A self-righteous zealot even 
“prefers to see the other fall rather than to have wrongly predicted his 
fall” (22).
While it may be tempting to join the throngs of the self-righteous, von 
Hildebrand argues that the Christian ought to approach evildoers with 
neither the hypocritical joy that the self-righteous zealot takes in expos-
ing others’ sin, nor the denial of objective moral laws typical of the situ-
ation ethicist. Rather, “the Christian will never judge before knowing the 
motives, the inner attitude that the sinner himself has toward his sin, and 
before knowing all the circumstances. . . . He will not yet form an opinion 
of the action’s specific moral quality, of the degree of the man’s responsi-
bility, and still less of the man’s character” (121, italics original). When 
confronted with certainty about a sinful act, the intentions of the sinner, 
and the circumstances, the Christian’s underlying love of God and neigh-
bor makes him respond in sorrow: sorrow that such an offense against 
God has been committed, sorrow that his neighbor has distanced himself 
from the source of all good, and an awareness that the Christian himself 
could sin in a like manner or could have been instrumental in encour-
aging this sin—and could even now push the sinner away from God by 
his actions. Instead of condemning the other in order to affirm his own 
moral standing, von Hildebrand argues that the true Christian will reject 
evil, but without assuming any superiority over the sinner. The Christian 
should focus on the reconciliation of the sinner to God.
This may seem to leave the Christian in a state of guilty uncertainty 
and constant fear about his actions and their repercussions, but von 
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Hildebrand argues that such a person will have what he calls “freedom of 
spirit”: “a clear sense of the hierarchy of values and of the rank of moral 
commandments” (73). Freedom of spirit allows us to distinguish between 
the spirit and the letter of the law so that we will not be anxious when a 
higher obligation makes a lower obligation impossible. However, freedom 
of spirit is not freedom from law, as the situation ethicist would have it. In 
opposition to thinkers such as Joseph Fletcher who argue that laws lose 
importance in the face of love, von Hildebrand points out that the reverse 
is true: when one is motivated by one’s love for God, one will be even 
more eager to discover and abide by the laws given us by God (152). It is 
true that in particular situations, as long as the available choices are not 
morally prohibited, commandments and general rules may not suffice in 
determining what is best for us to do: we may need to take into account 
what our own vices and weaknesses are and avoid that which will put us 
in imprudent moral danger (139). This is always in addition to obeying 
God’s commandments, however, not a replacement of these laws.
One minor limitation of this book is that, while the theory is compat-
ible with a broad range of Christian traditions, it is written from a dis-
tinctly Catholic perspective. This is emphasized by some of the examples 
of sins discussed, e.g., not attending Mass on a Sunday. Obviously, one 
can simply substitute examples of similar faults without changing von 
Hildebrand’s argument.
Somewhat more problematic is von Hildebrand’s infelicitous use of 
terms in categorizing kinds of moral obligation. “Formal obligations” he 
defines as obligations “accessible to juridical terms; they are connected 
with juridical liabilities,” while “material obligations” are not (59–60). 
This does not seem to fit any traditional division of matter and form. 
Formal obligations, in this context, can be reduced to material obliga-
tions (though he says that it can be tempting for bureaucratic types to 
ignore obligations which cannot be stated in legal language) (62). This 
makes for some confusing discussion, especially since he later calls the 
“intrinsic element of oughtness” the “formal characteristic of the moral 
sphere” (128) and—more conventionally—refers to Kant’s ethical theory 
as a “formalism” (151).
Another potentially confusing distinction is found in the fourth chapter. 
As John Finnis notes in his introduction, von Hildebrand follows Thomas 
Aquinas in stating that only prohibitions are to be followed regardless 
of circumstances and conflicting moral commands; prescriptions, on the 
other hand, may be overridden by other moral obligations (xxvii). Von 
Hildebrand mentions prohibitions when he considers whether one can 
satisfy the spirit of the law without satisfying the letter; he claims that 
this contrast of spirit and letter is not possible for “moral commandments 
including an absolute veto. . . . It makes no sense to say that although 
someone committed adultery in the literal sense of the word he remains 
true to the spirit of the commandment” (55). However, he goes on to make 
the same claim about positive moral commandments, qualifying this with 
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a footnote noting that a “valid excuse” could be made (55n7). While tech-
nically true, this distracts from an otherwise clear distinction he is making, 
and the rest of the text is clear that only prohibitions are universally valid.
Despite these minor limitations, Morality and Situation Ethics is well 
worth the investment of reading. Besides giving detailed descriptions of a 
spectrum of familiar moral characters, von Hildebrand engages in a phe-
nomenological exploration of temptation, sin, and the perception of val-
ues, including moral values and morally relevant values. This text builds 
on premises central to von Hildebrand’s work: that actions, affective 
responses to value, and habitual character traits are all of moral value, and 
that we radically misunderstand the moral realm if we attempt to reduce 
moral values to only one of these (83; see also Dietrich von Hildebrand, 
Ethics (Franciscan Herald Press, 1972)) Nevertheless, enough detail is 
given here that one need not have read his other work. This text could 
even serve as a brief introduction to—and an indirect argument for—his 
ethical theory as a whole.
Morality and Situation Ethics is a clear, coherent, and persuasive book; it 
accomplishes the rare feat of challenging both the reader’s abstract moral 
theories and his day-to-day habits.
